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CHAPTER 18

Choosing the Elite
Recmitment, Assessment, and Selection
in Law Enforcement Tactical Teams and
Military Special Forces
Ole Boe, Kristin K. Woolley, and John Durkin

NYPD Emergency Service Unit

In the early morning hours of July 31, 2007, Gazi Abu Mezer and Lafi
Khalil, two PcUestinians who had entered the United States after exploiting loopholes in the immigration system. were in the operational phase
of a planned suicide bombing of the New York City "fransit system. Their
weapons: simple pipe bombs with electrical detonating switches packed
into knapsacks. Two things would stand in the way of their attempt at
martyrdom-their Egyptian roommate and the New York City Fblice
Department's Emergency Service Unit (ESU).
Mossabah, the roommate, had been taken to the New York Fblice
Department's 88th Precinct. When the ESU tour commandex:, a veteran
lieutenant arrived at the precinct, he interviewed Mossabah, having him
start at the beginning of his recollections, interrupting him for clarifications
and details. After digesting what he had heard, the commander began
apprising his leadership of the situation and stressing that he believed
Mossabah. He then looked at the roster of ESU officers working his shift,
from midnight to 8 a.m. The urgency of the situation prohibited him from
calling in people from home and handpicking a team to enter the apartment Mossabah shared with the two suspects; he would have to go with
those already available. The commander called a sergeant and four police
officers and told them to meet him at the precinct.
After the five arrived, Mossabah was again asked to tell his stoty
from the beginning. They interrupted him with even more questions
333
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and requests for clarification and had him draw an extensive diagram of
his apartment building's exterior and his apartment's interior, highlight-

ing the locations of the backpacks as well as the spaces Mezer and Khalil
normally ocrupied. The commander took his team into another room and
devised his tactical plan, giving out assignments as they progressed. The
team would exerute a standard dynamic search warrant entry. Mossabah
would lead them to the building. and they would enter using his key. The
building the team saw upon exiting their vehicle looked nothing like the
one Mossabah had sketched at the precinct. Thoughts of an ambush ran
through the officers'minds. Mossabah then led the team through a narrow alley, at the end of which the team saw a building resembling the one
he had drawn.
The lead officer, protected by a hand-held body bunker, put the key in
the lock, turned it, and opened the door. The team flooded the apartment,
yelling. "Police! Get down on the floor!"The first officer through the door
was met by a man who attempted to physically disarm him. The officer
fired one shot from his 9-mm pistol, hitting his target. The wounded man
stumbled backwards, toward a black canvas bag in the comer of the room.
As he flipped one of four toggles on the front of the bag. another officer
fired two 5.56-mm rounds into him, and he crumpled into a comer of
the room. As the team pressed on, a second man in another room lunged
toward a backpack in a comer. Two shots from an officer's pistol dropped
him before he could reach it. The entry was over in less than ninety seconds. Both men were taken into rustody.
The FBI reconstructed both backpack improvised explosive devises,
determining them to be functional with a blast mdius of more than 100
yards. Their analysis also revealed that the toggle thrown on the first backpack should have detonated the device. It is not known why it failed.

T

JOINING THE ELITE

his incident highlights the challenges faced by leaders of law
enforcement tactical teams: A crisis situation arises suddenly.
Urgency calls for action. There is no time to handpick a response
team. The leader must work with whoever is on duty. What can a
law enforcement leader do to ensure that whoever is working counts among
the best the agency has? Perhaps through a framework for a selection process
of tactical teams that ensures transparency, provides a multilayered approach
for weeding out the unqualified, and has a multitiered means of selecting from
the strongest of the remaining candidates those capable of performing in dangerous, high-stress operations.
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The Emergency Service Unit, Special Weapons and Tactics (SWA1),
Emergency Response Team, and Emergency IncideI\t Team are a few of the
types of outfits called upon to handle and diffuse the most complex and dangerous situations law enforcement officers encounter. They deal with armed,
barricaded suspects, hostage situations, shooters, and high-risk search warrants. It is sometimes said that when the public needs help, they call the
police; when the police need help, they call Emergency Service. How does one
become a member of these elite units? More important, how do leaders select
applicants for assignment to the agency's special response teams? The process is similar to that of any other job: recruitment, an interview (selection),
and training followed by a probationary period (assessment). The recruitment,
selection, and assessment "training' procedures of three high-performing and
high-stakes organizations will be examined here.

Recruitment
Although some officers will "walk in" to apply to join a unit, implementing
a formal recruitment program lends legitimacy as well as transparency to
the process. It also helps debunk the myth of an"old boy" network, possibly
preventing future allegations of exclusion, and improve diversity. Two recommended courses of action are publication of a formal bulletin along with
briefings or presentations to roll calls department wide.
Publication and dissemination of a bulletin serves several purposes.
It reaches the largest pool of potential applicants because it is distributed
throughout the department. The bulletin should clearly state the minimum
requirements for assignment as time in service, education, special skills, evaluations, and physical requirements if any. Department-wide roll call presentations, given by members of the unit, validate the inclusiveness of the
recruitment process and allow prospective applicants the ability to pose questions to unit members. The application form itself should allow the applicant to
provide a detailed assignment history covering their entire career. Additional
information might include education, prior military service, and special skills.
It should also include a section in which the applicant can explain why he or
she should be selected and what they would bring to the unit. No application
should be considered without a signed recommendation and comments from
the applicant's commanding officer.
SelectiDn
The next step in the process is an oral interview. Any commander of a law
enforcement tactical unit who does not conduct oral interviews for applicants
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to their team is committing a grave error. There is simply no other way to fully
appraise an applicant than through a face-to-face meeting. Prior to conducting interviews, complete packages for all of the applicants must be assembled
that include at a minimum the completed application, the applicant's previous
evaluations and personnel file (or a synopsis of the latter), disciplinary records,
and details of any previous firearms discharges, force complaints, and open
internal investigations. Applicants with multiple firearms discharges or force
complaints and open internal investigations must be rigorously evaluated.
The interview panel should include frontline and ranking or executivelevel supervisors. The ranking officers should not only chair the interview, but
ask the majority of the questions. This tactic allows the panel to gauge the
applicant's ability to interact with ranking officers, that is, to operate in a somewhat stressful situation. Being able to function and communicate well under
stress is a requirement of any member of a law enforcement tactical team. At
the scene of a major event, the incident commander will usually want to confer
and coordinate directly with the members of the tactical team. Team members
must be able to cahnly and coherently respond and not be intimidated by rank.
Asking applicants about their hobbies, off-duty activities, and volunteer or
community service offers insight into the person rather than the officer. There
are two main methods of conducting an interview: asking direct questions or
asking situational questions. In the direct method, questions will elicit either
a negative or an affirmative answer. Usually these questions focus on integrity and procedure. The situational method, in which the applicant is presented
with a situation and asked to indicate how he or she would respond, requires
more detailed answers. Some situational questions should not and do not have
a right or wrong answer. The objective is to evaluate the applicant's analytical skills and gain insight into their decision-making process. For instance, a
sample situation might probe their response to an active shooter on a crowded
playground. Another method to evaluate a candidate's analytical ability is to
provide them with a written, mechanical-reasoning test whose goal is not to
evaluate their mechanical abilities but rather their analytical ability.
There are many reasons why a police officer wants to become a member of their department's tactical team. Some relish the challenge and want to
belong to an elite unit. Others have prior militaIy service and enjoy the camaraderie of a small unit with a specific mission. One type looking to join the
team that must be identified during the oral interview is the one enthralled
by the "glamour factor," whose sole desire is to be near the action and to
look good in the tactical uniform. These people tend not to be team oriented.
Posing situational questions where the desired answers are team focused will
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help identify them. Fortunately, glmy seekers rarely pass the team-related
parts of the physical tests.
The use of heavy body annol, additional weapons, and equipment combined, with the often drawn-out time frames of tactical situations require team
members to be in excellent physical condition. A physical fitness exam can
help determine a candidate's overall level of fitness and endurance and commitment to a personal fitness program. Some deparbnents use a militaI}'style physical fitness test to evaluate applicants'levels of fitness, but collective
bargaining agreements may preclude an agency from using this method. An
altemative is a test comprised of job-specific tasks, such as but not limited to
a timed stair climb while wearing tactical equipment and canying tools, moving and carrying heavy equipment, and simulated door ramming. The list is
limited only by the imagination. As long as the task is job specific, it should
survive a union grievance. During the test, instructors and evaluators should
ratchet up the mental stress but refrain from hazing candidates.
A tactical law enforcement officer must be able to function in a highstress environment, often for an extended period. The applicant must be able
to deal with the physical and mental stress while preventing his personal feelings and emotions from interfering with a safe resolution of the incident. Also,
some incidents will be ended by the application of deadly physical force. The
interview process and the physical should weed out the majority of unacceptable candidates, but no system is perfect; one or two undesirables may give
all the right answers in an interview and max the physical. Interviewing well
and being in good shape does not automatically translate into being qualified
for selection. Instinct, or gut feeling, is one of a police officer's greatest tools. If
during the selection process a member of the selection committee thinks that
something just doesn't feel right about an applicant, his or her instinct is probably right. The applicant should not be selected for assignment.

Training
After the interviews and physicals and selection process, the next step is training. Most large deparbnents have a formal training school, but smaller ones
may only have a field training, or an on-the-job program, where the newly
assigned are mentored by a senior team member. Regardless of the size or
the location, the training program must be structured and fonnalized with
clearly measurable objectives for each part of the curriculum. The training curriculum should be focused on the unit's mission. Some units may encompass
all aspects of a tactical situation, ranging from breaching, to hostage negotiation, to rendering explosives safe. Others may focus on breaching and subject
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apprehension. Regardless of the team's mission, the student's initial training
curriculum must cover each aspect of its core function.
Selection for training does not guarantee selection for the unit. Regardless
of a trainee's rank, the cadre must be in charge. The training program should
be mentally and physically taxing while devoid of hazing. The tactical team
and the department's leadership must give the cadre the authority to remove
any trainee for unsatisfactoxy performance. Prior to the start of training, students should be provided with a list of the required standards for perfonnance
in training. Flagrant safety violations, such as accidental discharges and unsafe
weapons handling, should be automatic cause for dismissal. Upon completion
of the training program, the new team member should be assigned to a senior
team member for assessment. This officer acts as a field training officer and
mentor for at least six months. A newly assigned team member should not be
considered fully qualified for at least twelve to eighteen months after completion of his or her training.

U.S. ARMY SPECIAL FORCES
The Thliban move freely throughout Helmand province in Afghanistan.
They run a well-established web of safe houses that crisscross the desert.
shuttling resources throughout the area. These Hmt linesH are numerous,
flexible, and almost invisible, but are the key leads to finding and capturing Taliban leaders and their large caches of equipment and supplies. In
fall 2009 Captain M and his Special Forces Operational DetachmentAlpha
(SFODA) team of twelve men sought to disrupt one of these networks and
question the men involved. They planned and executed a five-day opemtion equivalent in size and scope to managing a large multinational corporation. It involved more than 200 soldiers, civilians, and support personnel.
Captain M had to request. and coordinate more than ten sepamte supporting elements, including two dedicated Blackhawk helicopters, logistical
support from a U.S. Marine Corps unit, translators, interrogators, demolitions, and a force of twelve Afghan soldiers to spearhead the mission.
Captain M was twenty-seven years old.

What made this operation different from the myriad of conventional operations soldiers and marines conduct evexy day in Afghanistan is that Captain
M and his team conceived and carried out the entire mission on their own.
This is typical of a SFODA that is expected to function independently, think
creatively, and use the Hby, with" and throughH method of engagement common to Special Operations forces (Sap) missions. Such missions include
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short, violent, and direct engagements using host nation troops to augment
the SFODA or the SFODA will train and prepare host nation annies to defend
their countIy against an insurgency. Captain M. had to rehearse the entire
plan, de-conflict his opemtion with Marine and Spanish general officers, and
be prepared to take responsibility for billions of dollars worth of assets not to
mention the lives of the personnel working under him.
How did Captain M come to join this elite organization? How was he
able to stand out among his peers to excel during the assessment and selection phase? A brief historiCal review reveals that elite groups are usually created because of a demonstrated need. The Green Berets, a Special Forces unit,
were bom out of necessity, tracing their roots to the demands of the Office of
Strategic Services (OSS) in the early 19408. Colone1"Wild Bm"Donovan, the
founder of OSS, conceived of a force of individuals whose mission would be
to go behind enemy Jines and train indigenous forces to disrupt and ultimately
defeat enemy capabilities, all undetected.l Perfonnance of these tasks required
exceptional individual intelligence, physical agility, special language and technical skills, and nerves of steel Operators were init4illy selected based on their
personal connections, leading to the joke that OSS stood for uOh so social"
As is often the case in the military, mistakes in the field drive innovation.
Opemtors were often unprepared and overwhelmed by the psychological
demands of the job, which included m.airttajning a cover, working in isolation, and being under the constant threat of captiviiy.2 It became necessaxy to
develop better methods of selecting operators for these unconventional missions. Colonel Donovan eventually elicited the support of prominent psychologists to help form a nucleus of professionals to advise commanders about
the best practices for the recruitment, assessment, and selection of men and
women for the OSS. A thorough account of this program was recorded in The
Assessment ofMen.3 Aspects of it are still used today at the U.S. Army John F.
Kennedy Special Watfare Center and School (USA]FKSWCS).

Recruibnent
How do the Special Forces find what they are looking for? The Arrnr has a
standardized process involving a permanent group of SF soldiers trained in
marketing and "selling" SF to find and prepare quality soldiers for SF duty. The
Special Opemtions Recruiting Battalion's (SORB) sole pw:pose is to educate,
promote, and advise soldiers and their families about Special Opemtions (SO)
jobs in the Army. There are several benefits to this dedicated asset. First, the
recruiters know and have lived as SF opemtors. They are the best possible representatives of the organization. Second, the SORB recruiters are constantly
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communicating with USAjFKSWCS, mamtaining an awareness of changing
requirements and the needs of the force. Third, marketing efforts, such as the
Special Operations Parachute Demonstration Team, internet outreach campaigns, promotional videos and documentaries, and a chance to experience SF
training through virtual reality technology can make being an SF operator the
job of choice.
Once an applicant is interested, he is required to sit down with a recruiter
to discuss basic requirements. H all basic requirements are met, soldiers are
invited to attend the Special Forces Assessment and Selection (SFAS), located
at Ft. Bragg, North Carolina. SFAS is a rigorous three-week test of physical
and mental stamina. The program assesses and selects the best soldiers for
the organization by measuring individual and group performance in a series
of stressful events, such as land navigationj extended road marches, and team
problem-solving tasks. H a candidate's performance is acceptable, he will be
given the opportunity to enroll in the Special Forces Qualification Course
(SFQC) where he will learn a specialized skill and a language and complete a
culmination training exercise ca1led Robin Sage, where all his skills are tested.
Once a graduate and awarded the coveted Green Beret, he is assigned to a
Special Forces group and begins to perform his duties and responsibilities on
an Operational Detachment Alpha (ODA). The entire process can take up to
twenty-four months, so the recruiter must critically evaluate the commitment
of the applicant.
Recruiting for elite organizations like SF can benefit from the support of
former SF operators and their families. These include retirees and families of
wounded and fallen comrades. Probably the most effective recruiting tool is
the loyalty and constancy found among the SF community. It is umnatched in
the conventional Army.
Assessment
What kind of person emerges when he or she is faced with great adversity?
Teddy Roosevelt said. liThe boy who is going to make a great man must not
make up his mind merely to overcome a thousand obstacles, but to win in
spite of a thousand defeats."4 SFAS gives each candidate an opportunity to
demonstrate an ability to learn, work as part of a team, and maintain motivation through intense physical and psychological challenges. Each candidate
is made equal during the assessment phase; rank, experience, and connections are all disregarded. Many of those who complete the assessment phase
report that the program was the most difficult test of their lives. This is because
the psycholOgical stressors of unpredictability, physical discomfort, fatigue,
and constant evaluation over several weeks are fairly effective at exposing the
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fortitude of each candidate. It is in this environment that people like Captain
M slowly rise to the top and stand out among their peers. Research has shown
that Special Forces soldiexs produce more of a protein-like molecule in the
blood known as neuropeptide Y. This molecule helps calm the brain in stressful situations.5
Intelligence, character, and commitment are the three most important
traits looked £or during the assessment phase. Each candidate is evaluated
using the Whole Man modeL which is a Gestalt approach following the OSS
model.6 This means that the assessment phase combines a myriad of tasks
over time to reduce error and provide the selection committee with the best
"snapshot" of the candidate. There are many opportunities for the candidate
to fail and to succeed, and many opportunities for the candidate's traits to
be observed.
The tasks used to test candidates are designed to be stressful, but each
task can be accomplished with some basic physical preparation and grit. For
example, one well-known candidate exercise is the ~asty Nick" obstacle
course, aptly named after Colonel NICk Rowe. Rowe, best known for his book
Five Yean; to Freedom, was an SF officer, POw, and strong advocate for physically and mentally preparing SF soldiexs £or captivity and to return home with
honor. 7 His stoty is a reminder to SF candidates to show courage and strength
in the face of adversity. The course is grueling, with more than twenty obstacle
features. The assessoIS are particularly interested in how the candidates react
to "perceived failure." Does a candidate bounce back and demonstrate a commitment to improve his peIformance? In addition. a candidate's character may
be tested £or IIcheating" during certain tasks. Will the candidate cheat again if
given another opportunity? These assessments are designed to relate directly
to real-world issues commonly confronted by SF soldieIS in combat. These
kinds of situations require an uncommon resilience or ability to bounce back
and continue with the mission. SF operators need to be exceptionally stress
tolerant, as their numbeIS are few, their missions more dangerous than those
conventional forces may conduct, and their impact on the battlefield greater
because of their special type of missions.
Candidates are constantly reminded that they arellalways being assessed,"
but how and when will usually be unknown to them. Events and tests are
not always what they seem. This fact is even more pronounced during
team assessment events, which are designed to evaluate how well candidates wod< together to accomplish a task: how well do they plan, communicate their plan. adjust to changing conditions, accomplish the task, and lead
by example? Candidates are not necessarily judged on whether they finish
a task; what matters is their approach and how they organize the effort. In
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addition. candidates are judged on how well they follow the leader. In some
cases, a leader is not identified.1bis practice was a common assessment technique used during British officer selection after World War 1.8 Leaderless tasks
help eva1uatOIS deteImine who in a group has naturalleadeIShip skills. Team
assessment events also give evaluatoIS insight into peer-to-peer relationships.
Peer evaluations are another tool used to gauge a candidate's performance within a group. Fellow candidates often are more candid and direct
when it comes to the men they feel they can serve and live with on an ODA.
Peer evaluations are criticized by some who claim that they are useful only
for measuring the Npopularity" of an individual. Research suggests, however,
that peer evaluations are helpful in providing feedback to individuals about
their perfonnance. Such evaluations also give individuals spedfici concrete
infonnation on what they can improve about their behavior.' R!er evaluations
reflect a unique dynamic on an SPODA: the ability to accept and give blunt
and pmctical feedback.
The assessment phase ends with the requisite data collected for each candidate, and the process of reviewing each candidate begins. The assessors utilize a large database to collect and store data for every class that attends SFAS.
The database includes more than 27,000 individual records.1bis WIlYt data can
be reviewed across, between, and within groups. 'IIends are monitored and
changes to the program can be made based on the available data.

Selection
Selection decisions are made based on the needs of the SF community as
well as the data collected on each candidate. SF leadeIS involved in selecting the newest member of the regiment are guided by what are called Special
Operations Forces 'Ihtths.10 These are inscribed in the halls of the Special
Warfare Center and School and are helpful reminders of the boundaries that
limit decisions about hiring the right kind of person for the job.

Humans are more importtmttJum hRrdware. No matter what technology
offers, the individual operator and his ability to master and use that technology
are critical. This means that the ability to solve problems, learn and use a
language in a foreign country, and build relationships with the indigenous
population is more important than the newest weapons system, the fastest
computer program, or the best long-range surveillance optics. With these basic
mental skills, SF operators can and will excel in any kind of environment The
organization seeks individuals Dke Captain M who can per£onn when help
does not arrive on time and can carry on in spite of fafiure.
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Quality is better than quantity. This statement is under constant scrutiny
as SF grows exponentially to meet the needs of the force. Soldiers that show
character and integrity and an ability to resist temptation and to cope with
perceived negative life events are highlyregarded.At the same time, high energy,
adventurousness, and risk-takmg behaviors are equally regarded. Individuals
who push limits are acceptable as long as they demonstrate an awareness of
boundaries and self-regulation. Captain M learned during the assessment
phase to seek and accept constant scrutiny by his subordinates, peers, and
su.perioIs. This habit forces them to always petfonn their best regardless of the
circumstances and is a hallmark trait of an elite operator.
Special Operations forces cannot be mass produced. This statement
reminds the leaders selecting soldiers for this elite organization that individual
attention, coaching, mentoring, and learning takes time. 'fraining cannot
be rushed.
Competent Special Operations foTUs cannot be created

after

emngencies occur. It is crucial that SF operators be ready to petfonn their job
at anytime. It is equa11ycrucia1 that the SF IpipeIine"continue to feed SFODAs
with competent men. Fortuna~ SF has a unique system that ensures that
recruiters, assessors, and commanders are up to date on force needs. SF
operators are routinely rotated back to the SORB and the Special Warfare
Center and School as instructors or training company commanders.
The Special Operations Forces'Iiuths guide selection decisions but there
are also some checks and balances. The commander balances his judgment
of candidate perfonnance with the input of other senior SF leaders and support personnel on a se1ecti.on board consisting of current and former commanders, command sergeants major, staff officers, psychologists, and civilians
with expertise in the SF community. Although the psychologist or other board
member may have the power to influence, the commander retains the authority to make the final decision regarding the selection of a candidate. Another
practice is to identify candidates who may not be a good fit for the job of SF
operator. As stated in one assessment text, "Results of wise decisions can
range from the mere absence of problems to genuinely excellent outcomes
promoting organizational purposes[.] ..• [qonsequences of unwise decisions
can range from inconvenience to disaster,"ll
Selection errors exist even when rigorous recruitment and assessment
tools are in place. Individuals who pass the selection gates are usually persons
with exceptional qualities. Those who enter the Special Forces regiment without these qualities will typically be exposed and removed from further training.
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THE NORWEGIAN ARMY SPECIAL FORCES
The special forces team in the MH-47D Chinook helicopter had prepared
themselves well for the upcoming mission---tIacking down members of
the Thliban in a remote area of Afghanistan. The low-level flight towaId
their drop-off point was not an easy ride for the team and their leader.
The loadmaster gave the first signal, indicating ten minutes to drop-off.
The team leader turned on his GPS and reviewed the infiltration route one
more time. The team then made the necessaIY last-minute checks.
As the loadmaster gave the signal for one minute to drop-off, the pilots
decreased the speed of the helicopter. The team grabbed their backpacks
by their handles, preparing to start dragging them towaId the tamp of the
helicopter. When the Chinook hovered over the drop-off point, the loadmaster got down on his knee, turned around,. and commanded,.nGo! Go!
Go!RJhe team dragged their heavy backpacks towaId the tamp and down
it. They then threw themselves to the ground amid an inferno of dust and
small rocks whipped up by the rotor blades. The Chinook lifted off and
disappeared quickly in the darkness. The team got their weapons up and
secured the 360 degrees around them. The silence they experienced was
incredible. The team leader knew that they were on their own now, surrounded by enemies that wanted nothing more than to capture, torture,
and kill them. The team leader focused on the job they had to do, and the
team soon started moving. The hunt had begun.

The Norwegian army special forces, Forsvarets Spesialkommando I HBerens
Jegerkommando (FSKIHJK), took part during Operation Enduring FreedOlll.
Task Force K-Bar, and Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan. The size of the
unit is classified. Operators from FSK/HjK were decorated with the U.S.
Navy Presidential Unit Citation for their contributions in Afghanistan from
December 2001 to April 2002.12 These operations, as well as the one described
above, can place a heavy mental and physical burden on the personnel
involved, especially those responsible for leading in such situations. Men and
women who lead units in the world's harshest environments are referred to as
in extremis leaders.13

Racrui1mant
Imagine being the team leader in the chopper before being dropped on the
ground in Afghanistan. Where would you find people like yourself to follow
you on such a mission? What kind of person can cope with the type of training required? ThUning soldiers to handle the extra load and weight has been
shown to be a decisive factor for success in operations in Afghanistan.l 4.
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Table 18.1 Physical RequiremenlS for Norwegian Spacial Forces Candidates
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Push-ups

45

Feet together, hands shoulder-width apart

Sit-ups

45

For 2 minutes

Pull-ups

8

Back raise

20

Step test

140

Running

32

Chin over the bar for each pull-up
Repeated at 5-second intervals
Take 70 steps with each foot carrying a 25
kilogram backpack
Complete 32 laps on a 15-by-7-meter short
track dropping and touching chest to ground
on one 15-meter side, and on the other
15-meter side dropping to the ground and
rolling onto the back

Swimming

Swim 400 meters freestyle under 11
minutes; swim 25 meters underwater;
dive to a depth of 4 meters

Speed march

Complete 30 kilometers, with a 25-kilogram
backpack and weapon, in under 4 hours and
45 minutes

Orienteering

Navigate various lengths of terrain while
carrying different loads in a backpack

FSI<IHJK operators come from all classes of SOciety.15 At the age of seventeen, they receive a letter from the NOIWegian National Service Administration
requiring them to appear at a nearby National Service Centre to be tested on
their suitability for military service. Those who are deterrnm.ed to be qualified
for military service are called to a military service center close to where they live.
There they undergo a series of physical and mental tests. Applying for the special forces is popular. The minimum requirements for are listed in Table 18.1.
These requirements should be within reach of most potential candidates,
but the drop-out rate can be as high as 90 percent once the selection period
begins. Not many become an SF operator. After basic education as an SF operator, some members receive further education, up to a master's leveL16
Many candidates applying to FSKIH]K have already served as airborne
rangers for one year during their compulsory military service. Only 4 to 5 percent of new soldiers make it through the selection period to become rangers
in the first place.17 The airborne rangers who serve the year usually are good
candidates for SF education. Table 18.2 provides a brief overview of the traits
and characteristics that FSK!HJK finds desirable in candidates.
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Table 18.2 Desired Traits and Characteristics of Norwegian Special Forces Candidates
.. Likes to push their own limits
.. Knows how to follow rules and regulations
.. Able to think and operate independently
.. Willing to obey an order and to commit to the team
.. Possesses above average control over emotions and a high tolerance for stress
.. Manages stress and ambiguity well
.. Has stamina
.. Able to cope well with people
.. Has a goal-driven behavior that allows for making detached and realistic judgments
and exhibits coherent cognition

FSI<IHjK searches for fast learners who can apply knowledge quickly. It
also emphasizes general intelligence, and good psychomotor skills in candidates.18 One might easily imagine that while riding in a chopper before being
dropped in Afghanistan is a demanding exercise. Being able to handle the
unknown, the unknowable, and the subsequent stress over time is a crucial
component of the physical and psychological makeup of an SF operator or
team leader.

Assessment
After completing basic education, an operator only needs to make small
adjustments to shift focus from winter warfare in Norway to operations in
Afghanistan or other places in the world. However, common knowledge, an
understanding of other people's culture, occupational proficiency, language
skills, and the ability to improvise are some of the most important factors that
contributed to the success of FSI<IHjK operators in Afghanistan. These skills
have to be developed over years.
Th.tst, integrity, and flexJ.bility are also important for an SF operator. FSKJ
HJK operators are taught from the start to work in pairs. They are allowed to
go to the commander and say that they cannot work with so and so, a type of
peer evaluation similar to that in the U.S. Special Forces. 'Iiust is also manifest
in the high degree of openness among team members. After conducting missions, operators must attend a debriefing and talk to the unit's psychologist.19

Selection
Selection is an extensive process, based upon the experiences, practices, and
knowledge of FSI<IHjK operators, officers, and psychologists over the years.
The first selection phase lasts three weeks and has many of the same elements
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as in SFAS to test potential candidates' physical and mental stamina. This
includes, for instance, long marches with heavy backpacks. Research on paratrooper aspirants has revealed these individuals to be gifted with above average intelligence.2Il An SF operator needs to be an individualist and a good
team player at the same time. Believing that one will succeed can be decisive
in accomplishing a mission. 21 Therefore, belief in one's ability to solve whatever problems arise provides an advantage when applying to an SF unit.
The soldiers in Afghanistan have experienced a significant number of
knee and back injuries, so testing future FSKIHJK candidates' capacity for
marching while carrying heavy loads for long stretches would be a good idea.22
The histoxy of FSKIHJK reveals that the best predictor of which candidates
will make it through the selection process is the ability to manage physical
loads over time. In the opening scenario here, all the team members, including
the leader, had heavy packs that they knew they would have to carxy £or long
distances over unforgiving terrain.
As in the British Special Air Service, most of FSKJH]K's selection process
is done by experienced SF officers.23 Many of them have gut feelings about
who will make it through the experience. They most likely have been subjected to similar situations as the team and team leader in Afghanistan and
know what traits and characteristics to look for in a potential candidate.

CONCWSION
Members in militaxy special forces and law enforcement emergency service
units have a lot in common, including working in dangerous and unknowable
situations, coping with uncertain~ and making quick decisions. Members of
such units are normally of above average intelligent and have the willpower
to go the extra mile. Establishing a formal recruitment system is critical, otherwise these units might confront a shortage of candidates applying to them.
Using experienced officers during selection or mentors during the assessment
periods is recommended.
Putting candidates through one or several well-organized interviews will
reveal important information about a potential candidate. Identifying a candidate's motivation for wanting to join a unit is crucial. A strong inner drive
is necessm:y, but must be combined with the right attitude. Successful candidates will show that they have the ability to learn fast and to put acquired
knowledge into action when needed.
Several tests should be conducted to detennine whether a candidate can
withstand the physical and mental stresses of the job. The traits to look for are
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intelligence, commitment, and good character along with a high tolerance for
stress. Testing how candidates function under physical stress also reveals personality traits, willpower, and ability to work with others. An ability to bounce
back from bad or difficult situations and the level of comfort with ambiguity must be detennined. Honest feedback through peer eva1uatiol\ and candidates' response to it, is critical. They must function well on an individual
and team level, displaying cooperatiOl\ trust, and integrity. It takes time to
find individuals through the recruitment, assessment, and selection process
with the physical and mental stamina needed to perform in the type of units
under discussion.

KEY TAKE-AWAY POINTS
1. Elite organizations use dedicated assets to recruit, assess, and select members. These duties are separate from training.
2. Assessment for elite organizations is multidimensional and longitudinal.
No one task or test is the sole basis for selection or rejection.
3.

Operators in elite organizations accept, seek, and provide constant performance feedback.
4. Psychologists in elite organizations serve primarily as consultants in the
assessment and selection processes. Commanders have sole decisionmaking authority.
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